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Abstract: A node in Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) solely 
depends on neighbor nodes for its connectivity to the outer 
networks. It is completely different with fixed network 
connection where a central infrastructure is providing 
connectivity to the outside network for all mobile nodes there. 
This kind of situation makes MANET easier to build rather than 
fixed network with certain infrastructure. However, this nature 
of MANET makes it very vulnerable to various attacks, especially 
by nodes within the MANET that is called malicious nodes. This 
paper provides a preliminary result for MANET security 
enhancement based on AODV-UI routing protocol. In this work 
we implement an algorithm to detect and remove malicious nodes 
in AODV-UI routing protocol. We evaluate our work in different 
scenarios by varying the number of nodes, the number of 
malicious node, the sending rate of the node in concern, and the 
type of the attack i.e. route poisoning, black hole, packet 
spoofing. Our experiment shows that on average, an attack can 
be completely removed within 0.48 seconds in the worst case, 
with the traffic rate of 100 kbps, and 0.04 seconds in the best 
case, with the sending rate of 10 kbps. 
Index terms:  AODV-UI, Malicious Node, MANET Security 
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is a non-infrastructure network that consists of a 
collection of nodes that can communicate each other 
independently [1]. MANET enables ubiquitous and 
omnidirectional connection. It is designed for ease of setup 
and mobility. MANET is expected to be very useful in an 
urgent situation where infrastructure communication facilities 
are absent or difficult to install. For instance, MANET may be 
used in different situations e.g. a military communications 
network in a war field, an urgent rescue communication 
network when a disaster occurs, or a communications network 
in a temporary meeting.  
In MANET, the connection is made available for every 
node by such a relay mechanism that is done by every node 
there. This mechanism is mainly maintained by an ad-hoc  
 
routing protocol. Ad-hoc routing protocol should be able to 
create multi-hop routing between participating mobile nodes 
and forming continuous ad-hoc network without much user 
intervention. 
However, MANET is considered as a non-secure network 
to be relied on in several case of communication. Compared to 
fixed wired network, aside from its easy-to-setup advantage, 
MANET has some drawbacks especially in terms of network 
security. MANET is more vulnerable due to its physical 
configuration that is basically open; its topology that likely 
will change rapidly; its power and resources limitation of the 
node; and the absence of centralized management and 
monitoring unit. The problem complexity is increased by the 
fact that each node should actively discover the other, learn 
the topology and ensure the end-to-end connection. 
MANET implies that the underlying protocol relies on a 
mutual trust among all nodes. Every node in MANET has to 
work together with the others faithfully, whoever it is. This 
cooperation mechanism makes MANET easy to disrupt since 
there is no guarantee that the neighboring nodes will always 
forward one’s packet correctly. MANET is different from the 
wired network which has its connection governed directly by 
the legitimate device that is dedicated and fixed as the 
infrastructure. MANET’s connectivity is strongly depends on 
the other nodes. 
MANET uses wireless channel that is by default shared and 
accessible by all nodes, whether it is a legitimate member node 
or malicious node. Technically speaking, a node that is already 
acknowledged as the member of a MANET can disrupt the 
network. It can also play prank to the other node that relies its 
connection on this node by simply altering the packet 
forwarding path. All of these security drawbacks emerge 
because basically it is unknown whether malicious nodes exist 
in a sending path. 
Since the MANET is weaker to attack compared to the 
wire network, it is required to immediately detect and take 
measures for an attack against the MANET [2]. It is important 
to ensure all the nodes within a MANET to behave properly. 
Some approaches have been proposed. Ensuring node’s 
behavior basically can be achieved by membership registration. 
Although this is important, membership management in 
MANET is hard to implement without central management 
device. The other way is by limiting the access, but this 
approach is not a good practice for public MANET since it 
should be open and easy to setup. To mitigate this kind of 
security threat while maintaining MANET’s open nature, the 
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other approach is to secure the sending path between nodes. 
Such a security adjustment should be working together with 
the routing protocol. 
There are two types of ad-hoc routing protocols [3], 
namely: 
• Proactive: Destination Sequenced Distance Vector 
(DSDV), Cluster Switch Gateway Routing (CSGR), 
Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP), Optimized Link State 
Routing (OLSR). 
• Reactive: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), Ad-hoc On-
demand Distance Vector (AODV), Temporally Ordered 
Routing Algorithm (TORA), Associativity-Based Routing 
(ABR), Signal Stability Routing (SSR). 
 
Routing protocols in ad-hoc networks becomes a 
challenging problem to be investigated since a node can move 
freely, coming and leaving the coverage area, connect and 
disconnect to the network, as well as extending the coverage 
area and increasing the hop. 
This work incorporates a security measure on the AODV 
routing protocol, i.e. to detect and remove malicious node. This 
work concerns on how to secure the sending path. The primary 
focus of this mechanism is to guarantee that the forwarding 
path consist of legitimate nodes only. We review some similar 
works in section 2. Section 3 gives a brief review on AODV 
and AODV-UI. Section 4 explains the implementation of the 
proposed algorithm into AODV-UI. The simulation is 
conducted under various scenarios as discussed in section 5 
along with the result. Section 6 presents the conclusions and 
future works. 
 
II. MANET SECURITY 
Routing in MANET has two important steps, i.e. 
discovering the neighbors and route management. In MANET, 
neighborhood may rapidly change due to mobility. Neighbor 
discovery is very crucial since route formation uses the 
information gathered on this step. Taking this into account, the 
first security method is to secure neighbor discovery. 
Basically, security threat in MANET can be caused by a 
node that either does not forward other’s packet, does not 
forward packet to the correct route or altering the packet’s 
content. Other kind of threat could also be routing information 
manipulation and many kind of DoS that can be done both by 
flooding and signal jamming. 
In the ITU-T recommendation no. X.805 there are 8 
security dimensions that should be taken into account in 
security architecture for systems providing end-to-end 
communication [4]. Some of them are required to be addressed 
in MANET. There are some proposed methods to secure 
MANET in term of access control and authentication approach. 
This approach aims to control user’s access to the network and 
apply a proof of identity. In term of data confidentiality and 
privacy, some approaches have been introduced by performing 
encryptions. In term of communication security and data 
integrity there are some approaches introduced to mitigate 
packet spoofing and route poisoning. 
There are various ways to secure MANET. Reciprocal 
authentication between the sender and receiver based on the 
public key has been introduced in [5]. It invokes session key to 
further ensure that both nodes are legitimate. This method 
reduces the number of packets dropped compared to the normal 
AODV and DSR when malicious nodes exist. It requires a 
cluster head to manage keys and authentication service. Other 
security measures employing authentication have also been 
used such as in SAODV [6] and TAODV [7]. However, for 
authentication to be happened, one should aware how the key 
should be distributed and who should manage the process. 
Secure routing mechanism using control and confidence 
value has been proposed in [8]. In this work, a watchdog judges 
whether a node has an abnormal behavior in forwarding other 
packet. IN addition, node’s credence value is maintained for 
each node. In principle, this proposed method can detect black 
hole attack without much routing overhead. 
Another a trustworthiness measure is also employed in 
security adaptive protocol suite. This protocol suite introduces 
a certain level of security for each route that is attained through 
Ranked Neighbor Discovery (RND). It then judges the security 
level required by the application and route the packet 
accordingly. This Security-Aware Ad-hoc Routing (SAR) 
approach provides enhancement in its route discovery for 
including security attributes [9]. SAR enables the use of 
security as a negotiable metric to improve the relevance of the 
routes discovered by ad-hoc routing protocol. 
An approach based on fairness and trust has been 
introduced in CONFIDANT protocol [10]. The method is 
implemented on DSR protocol by employing 4 functionalities: 
(1) to monitor the neighbor for malicious behaviors, (2) to 
manage neighbor’s trust level using similar mechanism that is 
used in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), (3) to calculate node’s 
reputation based on its behavior and (4) to manage the path, 
classify it and determine whether it contains malicious node or 
not. However, there is no similar approach implemented in 
AODV protocol. 
III. AODV AND AODV-UI 
A. AODV 
AODV is a reactive distance vector routing protocol. It only 
requests a route when needed. The standard AODV was 
developed by C. E. Perkins, E.M. Belding-Royer and S. Das in 
RFC 3561 [11]. AODV nodes rely on control messages namely 
Route Requests (RREQs), Route Replies (RREPs) and Route 
Errors (RERRs) to communicate with others. All of this control 
messages are sent with UDP and IP encapsulation to manage 
the route on the routing table. 
The routing table stores information about the next hop to 
the destination and indicates the latest information. Routing 
tables managed by every node in AODV contains the following 
fields [11]: 
• Destination IP Address 
• Destination Sequence Number 
• Valid Destination Sequence Number flag 
• Other state and routing flags (e.g., valid, invalid, repairable, 
being repaired) 
• Network Interface 
• Hop Count (number of hops needed to reach destination) 
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• Next Hop 
• List of Precursors 
• Lifetime (expiration or deletion time of the route) 
Since it works on demand, AODV node does not maintain 
any route entry except for some seconds after the use of 
corresponding route entry. This timer ensures every node to 
serve only a ‘fresh’ route and to invalidate old route entry by 
itself. If a route to a destination exists, the node will use it to 
forward the packet. If the route does not exist, the sending 
node initiates path discovery by broadcasting the RREQ 
message. This type of message is used to enquiry route that 
satisfy the destination. The broadcast of RREQ message is 
limited by the TTL in the IP header. The RREQ message 
format can be seen in Fig. 1 
RREP message is used to propagate route information. 
This message serves as the reply for RREQ message. RREP 
message is sent unicastly along the way back to the RREQ’s 
sender. Nodes who can reply RREQ message with RREP 
message are either the destination node itself or any 
intermediate nodes that has a valid route to the destination that 
is asked by the RREQ message. If the nodes who receive the 
RREQ message is unable to give a reply, it must rebroadcast 
the RREQ to its neighboring nodes. Thus, when intermediate 
nodes receive a RREQ message, they update their routing 
table and forward the message. When the intermediate nodes 
receive Route Reply (RREP), they will forward it to the 
destination. The route reply message contains some fields as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3 Byte 4 
Type Flags + Reserved Hop Count 
RREQ ID 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Originator IP Address 
Originator Sequence Number 
Fig. 1. RREQ message format 
 
Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3 Byte 4 
Type Flags + Reserved + 
Prefix Size 
Hop Count 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Originator IP Address 
Lifetime 
Fig. 2. RREP message format 
 
Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3 Byte 4 
Type Flags + Reserved Dest. Count 
Unreachable Destination IP Address 
Unreachable Destination Sequence Number 
… <more unreachable destination & sequence> … 
Fig. 3. RRER message format 
 
Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3 Byte 4 
Type Reserved Hop Count 
R-RREP ID 
Destination IP Address 
Destination Sequence Number 
Originator IP Address 
Reply time 
Fig. 4. RRER message format 
RERR message is used to notify other nodes to remove a 
certain route. Each node monitors the next hop nodes noted in 
the valid routing entry. If the next hop for a certain route entry 
is no longer reachable, possibly because of node’s movements, 
this node will invalidate the route entry in its own routing table 
and send RRER message to the other node that is concerned 
about this route. By doing this, any other nodes that use this 
route will be aware that this route is no longer available. This 
reporting mechanism is made possible by a "precursor list" 
containing IP address for each its neighbors who are likely to 
use this node as a next hop towards other destination. The route 
error message contains some fields as shown in Fig 3. 
The special characteristic of AODV is the use of destination 
sequence number in each route entry. This value is calculated 
along the way as the RREP message being propagated. This 
value is to ensure loop-free route. When there are more than 
one route to a destination exists in routing table, the sender 
supposed to choose the one with the greatest sequence number. 
B. AODV-UI 
 
One of the disadvantages of AODV protocol is that the 
sender node must re-initiate the connection by running route 
discovery procedure to find new path when the connection 
between nodes is lost. Hence, AORV will introduce a lot of 
routing overhead as te mobility of nodes inside the MANET 
increase. AODV-UI [12] was developed to overcome this 
problem. AODV-UI is developed by Universitas Indonesia by 
Abdusy Syarif et al and was introduced in 2011. 
This proposed protocol combines gateway mode and 
reverse rote. AODV-UI can be used in hybrid ad-hoc networks 
and it has some improvement in routing overhead and energy 
consumption. This protocol has an algorithm to determine 
which nodes as an intermediate node. This protocol also 
includes energy as a parameter in selecting node. 
The gateway mode enables a node to be set as a gateway. In 
real implementation, this gateway node can be a stationary 
device backed with wired connection. Other mobile node on 
the MANET will use this gateway to connect to the outside 
network such as internet. This gateway mode is adopted from 
AODV+ [13]. 
AODV+ has been designed to achieve routing 
communication between node in ad-hoc network to node in 
wired network or infrastructure. This variant of AODV uses 
hybrid gateway discovery mode. It combines two gateway 
discovery models, i.e. reactive and proactive. The reactive 
gateway discovery is initiated by ad-hoc node to create or 
update a routing table to the gateway. In this discovery mode, 
mobile node will broadcast a route request (RREQ) message 
with "I" flag (RREQ_I). Only the gateway(s) addressed by this 
message will process it. In the contrary, the proactive gateway 
discovery is initiated by the gateway itself. This gateway can 
be a mobile node or other static terminal with wireless interface. 
It broadcasts a gateway advertisement (GWADV) message 
periodically to ad-hoc network, so a mobile node that receives 
the GWADV will update its route entry and recognize it as the 
gateway. 
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The reverse route in AODV0UI is adopted from R-AODV 
[14, 15]. R-AODV provides solutions for the MANET 
topology that is changing rapidly. Frequent change of network 
topology is a tough challenge for many important issues, such 
as routing protocol robustness and resilience performance 
degradation. This variant of AODV provides reverse route by 
trying multiple route replies. This protocol has been proved in 
reducing path fail correction message, reduce routing overhead, 
and shorten the time required for path recovery process. 
In R-AODV, RREQ message has additional 4-bytes field 
for timestamp. During the route discovery, immediately after 
receiving the first RREQ message, the node broadcast reverse 
request (R-RREQ) message rather than sending unicast RREP. 
The format of R-RREP message is illustrated in Fig 4. 
The processing procedure of this message is same as the 
RREP message in AODV. However, the nodes who send 
RREQ  will receive multiple R-RREQ suggesting a valid path 
toward the destination. This originating nodes will chose the 
best path to forwarding the packet. 
By broadcasting R-RREQ, this protocol has more control 
packet overhead. Nevertheless, this overhead is smaller 
compared to the original AODV that uses only single reply 
message in high-mobility MANET. For instance, in ad-hoc 
network has N number of terminals with M nodes participate in 
discovering a routing path, the required number of control 
messages to discover routing path for AODV (P) if it does not 
fail in first try is expressed in equation (1) 
 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑀𝑀 − 1 + 𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where t is the number of nodes forwarding RREP message.  
If source node fails in the first try, since it does not receive 
any RREP message during a certain interval time, the node will 
re-initiates path discovery process. It means that the number of 
control messages will be increased by the number of attempts, 
as expressed in equation (2)  
 P = c(M − 1 + t)  (2) 
where c is the number of attempt for route discovery.  
If we assume that R-AODV has at least one stable path that 
satisfies the RREQ, the number of control messages for R-
AODV (Q) is expressed in equation (3).  
 Q = 2M − 2  (3) 
Hence, we can conclude when c>1, standard AODV causes 
more packet overhead than the case of c=1 on R-AODV 
routing. This condition is likely to be experienced in MANET. 
As mentioned in [16], when the number of nodes is 100 and the 
number of flows is 50, 14% of total RREP messages are lost in 
standard AODV. 
IV. AODV-UI FOR SECURING PUBLIC MANET 
Most of the security measures that have been introduced for 
MANET are conducted by limiting node’s access to the 
network. We consider this kind of preventive security measure 
is not the best practice for public MANET where everyone is 
supposed to share and support other connectivity. In public 
MANET, the more nodes joined, the wider area can be 
covered, and the more people can be served without much 
sacrifice on their mobility. It is preferred to conduct detection 
and curative treatment assuming that the level of security 
required by users in public MANET is not too urgent. Hence, 
we mostly focus on mitigating the attack in MANET. 
Our proposed method enhances AODV-UI with the ability 
to detect and remove malicious nodes. It is accomplished by so 
called ‘hear’ and ‘compare’ mechanism. We define malicious 
nodes as a node that does not forward other packet; modify 
other packet in forwarding, and sending some kind of forged 
routing control packet. This algorithm is designed to overcome 
black hole attack, packet spoofing, and routing message 
flooding. 
In this proposed method, every node has a ‘hear’ 
mechanism that will capture the transmission even if it is not 
for this node. This capture is possible in 802.11 standards, 
since naturally every packet sending can be considered as a 
broadcast in physical level on the same wireless channel. This 
happens after the node sends a packet to a neighboring node to 
be relayed to the ‘unseen’ destination.  
Referring to the simple topology shown in Fig 5, when 
node_a wants to send a packet to node_c which is unseen from 
node_a, after node_a send the packet to node_b, node_a will 
keep ‘hearing’ node_b, whether this intermediate nodes 
relaying the packet to the other node. If node_b is not relaying 
node_a’s packet within a certain amount of time, node_a will 
consider node_b as a malicious node since it does malicious 
behavior, i.e. not forwarding other’s packet. 
 
Fig. 5. Simple configuration with sender, intermediate,  
and receiver node 
 
 
Fig. 6. Sender ‘hears’ if the intermediate node is relaying the packet 
 
 
Fig. 7. Sender mark the neighbor as malicious if sender  
cannot ‘hear’ the relay  
 
To accompany this ‘hearing’ mechanism, each sending 
node also keeps its sent packet for a while. This is then 
compared to the packet captured by ‘hearing’. If the captured 
packet content is different, this node will consider the 
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forwarding node as a malicious node. Every malicious node is 
remembered and removed from the routing table and neighbor 
management. 
For this to be done, an interval where the node is supposed 
to wait for the echoed packets by its neighbor is applied. We 
call this a Wait interval. If the delay is larger than this interval, 
the neighbor node is considered as malicious. The size of this 
interval is significant since it will give additional latency to 
every packet transmission. 
We consider propagation delay in defining this interval. If 
D is time required for a packet to travel from its origin until the 
direct neighbor, it may take the same amount of time for the 
echo packed to be broadcasted by the neighbor to be received 
by the sender. Thus, 2D is the minimum interval for waiting for 
echo packet. In this scenario, we use 3D for the maximum 
interval allowed. The proposed mechanism works as pseudo 
code shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Foreach packet sent 
{ 
 save packet information 
 waiting for Wait interval 
 { 
  If hear neighbor do forwarding the packet 
  { 
   If saved pkt info == heard pkt info 
   { 
    Neighbor normal 
   } 
   Else 
   { 
    Neighbor malicious 
  } 
  Else 
  { 
   If neighbor still reachable 
   { 
    Neighbor malicious 
   } 
   Else 
   { 
    Route error //topology change 
   } 




Fig. 8. Pseudocode of the proposed algorithm 
 
This ‘hear’ and ‘compare’ scheme is only applied for data 
packet. Our proposed method does not apply any encryption to 
the AODV message. It is kept in plain to make it accessible for 
public. However, we apply some delay timer to appropriately 
mitigate the flooding attack that can keep the node busy and 
further exhaust node’s battery.  
We perform modification in AODV UI to implement our 
proposed mechanism as follows: 
• Adds the ‘hear’ and ‘compare’ mechanism at 
AODV::recv() routine to be executed toward every packet 
received with similar packet unique ID with buffered packet 
(packet that has been sent before by the current node). 
• Adds a MAL packet for propagating malicious node 
information. 
• Set layer 2 broadcast as the default forwarding method in 
AODV::forward(). It is important to make NS explicitly 
simulate layer 2 broadcasts for the packet. It is required for 
‘hearing’ by the other node. This is only necessary for 
simulation purpose. 
• Adds a timer for ‘compare’ mechanism, called Wait 
interval. ‘Hear’ mechanism will active during this timer 
interval and when it hears an echoed packet, it ‘compares’ it 
with buffered packet. 
V. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT 
A. Experimental Setup 
Several parameters were evaluated and analyzed during our 
simulations. CBR is used to generate data traffic between the 
user and receiver with various sending rate. TCP is used for the 
transport protocol. The ACK from TCP is used to evaluate the 
round-trip latency. The MANET condition is varied by the 
number of malicious node and its position. Simulation 












Wait interval 0.3 seconds 
Number of node 
3 (1st scenario) 
and 10 (2nd 
scenario) 
No. of malicious node 1 
Sources Tahoe TCP 
Traffic type CBR 
 
B. Result and Discussion 
There are two main evaluation conducted to evaluate our 
proposed method. The first is round-trip latency and the second 
is the recovery time. We define the recovery time as the 
amount of time required to remove malicious node(s) from the 
routing table. 
Round-trip latency is measured by comparing timestamp of 
the packet sent and its ACK that is received back on the sender. 
The first scenario consists of three nodes: sender node, normal 
(legitimate) node who acts as intermediate node, and receiver 
node. The result from this scenario is depicted in Fig.9 and 
Fig.10 for original AODV and our proposed method 
respectively. Compared to the original AODV, the proposed 
secured AODV-UI has additional latency. This additional 
latency is proportional to the Wait time required for ‘hearing’ 
mechanism and it is inevitable. This implies that our proposed 
algorithm works as fine as AODV does in the normal 
environment excluding the mentioned additional latency.  
From 60 times of trials, on average, the best latency that 
TCP can deliver with AODV is approximately 24.09 ms, and 
with AODV-UI is 44 ms. As displayed in Fig.11, the latency 
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between secured AODV-UI is about 20 ms greater than the 
latency on the normal AODV. This is because of the drawbacks 
of the ‘hearing’ method. However, this additional latency is not 
much interference with overall performance of MANET. While 
introducing the drawback in term of latency, AODV-UI can 
handle attacks from malicious nodes. 
 
Fig. 9. Per-packet latency on various rate of CBR on AODV 
 
 
Fig. 10. Per-packet latency on various rate of CBR on  
secured AODV-UI 
The recovery time is measured by sending the packet to an 
‘unseen’ remote node, by relying to some intermediate nodes 
on a line. We set one of the intermediate node (in random 
position) to be a malicious node on a certain time, and compare 
this time to the timestamp when the sending node detect this 
malicious behaviors and remove this node from the routing 
table. Fig.12 shows that the recovery time is varied by sending 
rate, and most of them are twice as its latency. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Our proposed method to mitigate the common attacks on 
public MANET has been successfully implemented on ns2 
network simulator. This enhanced AODV-UI is proven for 
being robust against malicious node. The improvement that has 
been made on AODV-UI now has made it closer to be 
implemented on public MANET. However, for further 
MANET-specific security threat, we still do not prevent detour 
attack. This will improve gradually along with the 
implementation of public MANET as security requirements 
rises on the user side. Cross layer security measure may also be 
considered to overcome attacks on the lower layer. In the future 
work, we will implement a new trust mechanism as an early 
detection and prevention from various attacks.  
 
Fig. 11. Average latency on various rate of CBR 
 
 
Fig. 12. Recovery time on various rate of CBR on secured AODV-UI 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Harris Simaremare, Riri Fitri Sari, “Performance Evaluation of 
AODV variants on DDOS, Blackhole and Malicious Attacks” 
IJCSNS International Journal of Computer Science and Network 
Security, VOL.11 No.6, June 2011. 
[2] Jongoh Choi, Si-Ho Cha, GunWoo Park and JooSeok Song, 
"Malicious Nodes Detection in AODV-Based Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks" GESTS Int'l Trans. Computer Science and 
Engr.,Vol.18, No.1, 2005. 
[3] C. Kopp, “Ad-hoc Networking”, Background Article, Published 
in ‘System’, (2002) p.33-40. 
[4] Zachary Zeltsan, Security Architecture forSystems Providing 
End-to-End Communications, ITU-T Recommendation X.805, 
2003. 
[5] G.Varaprasad, S. Dhanalakshmi, M. Rajaram3, “New Security 
Algorithm for Mobile Adhoc Networks Using Zonal Routing 
Protocol”, 2008. 
[6] M. G. Zapata, “Secure Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector 
(SAODV) Routing”, ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing 
and Communications Review, p.106-107, Volume 6 Issue 3, 
July 2002. 
[7] Xiaoqi Li, Michael R. Lyu, and Jiangchuan Liu, “A Trust Model 
Based Routing Protocol for Secure Ad-hoc Networks”, IEEE 
Aerospace Conference Proceedings, 2004. 




















































HARWAHYU et al: AODV-UI WITH MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION AND REMOVAL FOR PUBLIC MANET 115
 
 
[8] Liu Jinghua, Geng Peng, Qiu Yingqiang, Feng Gui, “A Secure 
Routing Mechanism in AODV for Ad-Hoc Networks”, 
Proceedings of 2007 International Symposium on Intelligent 
Signal Processing and Communication Systems Nov.28-Dec.1, 
2007. 
[9] Seung Yi, Prasad Naldurg, Robin Kravets, “A Security-Aware 
Routing Protocol for Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks”, MobiHoc '01 
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on 
Mobile ad-hoc networking & computing, proceeding of, p.299-
302, 2001. 
[10] Buchegger, Sonja, and Jean-Yves Le Boudec. "Performance 
analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol." In Proceedings of the 
3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad-hoc 
networking & computing, pp. 226-236. ACM, 2002. 
[11] C. Perkin, E.M. Belding-Royer, S. Das, Ad-hoc On Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) Routing, IETF Internet Draft, 2002. 
[12] Abdusy Syarif,  Harris Simaremare, Sri Chusri Haryanti,  Riri 
Fitri Sari, "Adding Gateway Mode for R-AODV Routing 
Protocol in Hybrid Ad-hoc Network " IEEE Tencon conference, 
Bali, 2011. 
[13] A. Hamidian, ”Performance of Internet Acces Solutions in 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks”, Master Thesis, Lund University, 
2001 
[14] C. Kim, E. Talipov, B. Ahn , ”A Reverse AODV Routing 
Protocol in Ad-hoc Mobile Networks”,  IFIP-International 
Federation for Information Processing, Seoul, Korea,  August 
2006 
[15] E. Talipov, D. Jin, J. Jung, I. Ha, YJ Choi, C. Kim,”Path 
Hopping based on Reverse AODV for Security”, APNOMS, 
Busan, Korea, September 2006 
[16] Rendong Bai and Mukesh Singhal, “Salvaging Route Reply for 
On-Demand Routing Protocols in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks” in 
MSWIM 205, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Oct 2005. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ruki Harwahyu receives his Bsc degree at 
Departement of Electrical Engineering 
Universitas Indonesia in 2011. He is 
currently undergoing his dual degree 
master study at Information and 
Multimedia Network, Universitas 
Indonesia and Electronic & Computer 
Engineering, National Taiwan University 
of Science and Technology. He has been 
conducting research around the topic of 
Internet of Things.  
 
Boma Anantasatya Adhi receives his Bsc 
degree at Departement of Electrical 
Engineering Universitas Indonesia in 2010. 
He is currently undergoing his dual degree 
master study at Information and 
Multimedia Network, Universitas 
Indonesia and Computer and 
Communication Engineering University of 
Duisburg-Essen. His interests include hi-
performance computing, embedded and 
operating system and intelligent control. 
 
Harris Simaremare received the B.Sc. 
and Master degrees in Electrical 
Engineering from Universitas Gadjahmada. 
He is currently pursuing his PhD research 
at University of Haute-Alsace in Colmar 
France. He is working on security in 
wireless ad-hoc network. 
 
Abdusy Syarif receives his BSc degree in 
Informatic Engineering from Universitas 
Mercu Buana, Indonesia. And his Master 
degree in Electrical Engineering from 
Universitas Indonesia. He is currently 
pursuing his PhD research on ad-hoc hybrid 




Abdelhafid Abouaissa is an Associate 
Professor at the University of Haute-
Alsace, in Colmar France. He received the 
BS degree from Technical University of 
Wroclaw, Poland, in 1995, and the MS 
degree from Franche-Comté University of 
Besançon, France, in 1996. He obtained the 
PhD at Technical University of Belfort, 
France in January 2000. His interests 
include multimedia synchronization, group 
communication systems, QoS routing in 
Ad-Hoc, MPLS, DiffServ, and QoS management. 
 
Riri Fitri Sari, PhD. is a Professor at 
Electrical Engineering Departement of 
Universitas Indonesia. She received her Bsc 
degree in Electrical Engineering from 
Universitas Indonesia. She receive her  
MSc in Computer Science and Parallel 
Processing from University of Sheffeld, 
UK. And she received her PhD in 
Computer Science from University of 
Leeds, Leeds.  Riri Fitri Sari is a senior 
member of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE). 
 
Pascal Lorenz is a professor at the 
University of Haute-Alsace and responsible 
for the Network and Telecommunication 
Research Group. His research interests 
include QoS, wireless networks, and high-
speed networks. He is a member of many 
international program committees and has 
served as a guest editor for a number of 
journals, including Telecommunications 
Systems, IEEE Communications Magazine, 













116 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 8, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2012
